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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of Shariah-compliant status on oversubscription
of initial public offerings (IPOs) in Malaysia. It is believed that the Shariah-compliant status serves as a platform
that sends a credible signal to investors which could possibly explain the IPO oversubscription anomaly.
Design/methodology/approach – This study used a multivariate and quantile regression model which
involved 252 IPOs listed on BursaMalaysia from 2005 to 2015.
Findings – The results show a significant positive relationship between Shariah-compliant status and
oversubscription ratio, which suggests that companies with Shariah status could draw the attention of the
investors. Strict guidelines and permissible elements of Shariah-compliant are considered agreeable and
amicable by the investors.
Research limitations/implications – Future studies should look into financial ratio benchmark (cash and
debt) for determiningShariah-compliant status to enhance the understanding of oversubscription of IPOs inMalaysia.
Practical implications – This study offers practical understanding to the issuers and underwriters on
the factors that should be considered in assuring a good early performance of their issuance. Therefore, it will
benefit the issuers and underwriters in managing and planning the IPO process carefully.
Social implications – The results of this study provide a new insight for investors regarding important
information found in the prospectus when making the decisions to subscribe to IPOs.
Originality/value – This paper is one of the first to provide an empirical evidence of the impact of
Shariah-compliant status on oversubscription in the IPOmarket.
Keywords IPO, Financial crisis, Institutional investors, Retail investors, Quantile,
Fixed price mechanism, Offer size, Oversubscription, Shariah-compliant status, Initial returns
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
Initial public offerings (IPOs) serve as an alternative way of raising funds. For an issuer,
IPOs would be the preferred funding mechanism that provides several benefits for a
company, such as improving the public image of the company. However, there is a risk of
the IPOs not being subscribed by the market. If the market is healthy, an IPO would
normally be oversubscribed by investors. Oversubscription, which could be interpreted as
investors’ demand, is an essential element in the success of an IPO. In Malaysia, Dawson
(1987), Low and Yong (2011), Taufil-Mohd (2007) and Yong and Isa (2003) found that the
oversubscription rate was 44, 33.59, 41.14 and 43.71 times, respectively.
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Based on the existing literature, there are different levels of oversubscription observed in
different countries that denote there may be certain unique features in each country which
affect the performance of IPOs (Loughran et al., 1994; Taufil-Mohd, 2007). Pricing
mechanism on initiative to enhance the efficiency and transparency of theMalaysian market
is one of the distinct features in Malaysian IPOs. Generally, Malaysian IPOs are issued
through a fixed-price mechanism, unlike in developed countries, such as the USA where the
IPOs are normally issued through book-building and auction mechanisms. Under the fixed-
price mechanism, the offer price of the IPOs is fixed by the issuer and underwriter without
knowing the demand from investors. In contrast, under the book-building and auction
mechanisms, firms are allowed to extract information on shares demand from investors
before setting the final price and issue size. As a result, the level of oversubscription and
underpricing is lower for book-building and auction market as compared to fixed-price
mechanism (Agarwal et al., 2008; Low and Yong, 2011). Since the Malaysian IPO market
mainly uses fixed-price mechanism, it may have a different effect on oversubscription rates
as compared to other markets that use book-building and auction approaches. This scenario
calls for this study to examine the factors that trigger oversubscription in its attempts to fill
the gap in current literature pertaining to the subject of this study.
Another distinct feature of the Malaysian market is the Shariah-compliant status. The
Shariah-compliant status indicates that a company’s activities are free of non-permissible
conduct, such as interest-based transactions, unethical elements and doubtful transactions. In
other words, the income generated by companies from their primary business and investment
activities must be in line with Shariah principles. This is because Muslims are forbidden from
undertaking activities that do not adhere to religious or Shariah principles. Generally, the
Securities Commission (SC), through the ShariahAdvisory Council (SAC) and Bursa Malaysia,
undertakes the screening process of Shariah compliance to determine whether the companies
comply with its Shariah guidelines. This is important because the companies that comply with
Shariah guidelines are thoroughly scrutinized and monitored during the listing process by the
regulators. The development and growth of Islamic finance motivated the SAC to revise the
Shariah screening methodology effective from November 29, 2013. This includes
the introduction of financial ratio (cash and debt) for determining a Shariah-compliant status. It
is hoped that such initiative would attract foreign investors, especially Middle Eastern
investors, to subscribe to the IPOs and thereby, contribute toward Malaysia’s aspiration of
becoming a global Islamic hub for Islamic financial products and services.
If we were to look at the potential of Shariah-compliant IPOs in Figure 1, the percentage
of Shariah-compliant IPOs issued each year has increased rapidly where the number of
Shariah-compliant IPOs is higher than non-Shariah-compliant IPOs for the period of 2005 to
2015, except 2012. Specifically, the Shariah-compliant IPOs accounted for about 85 per cent
of the total IPOs for this particular period, as shown in Figure I.
During 2005 to 2007, the average oversubscription ratio (OSR) recorded was high due to
strong economic fundamentals. However, the average OSR declined during 2008 to 2010 due
to the global financial crisis that affected Malaysian economy. Nevertheless, the market
recovered from 2011 to 2015. Despite the issuance of IPOs showed decreasing trend, in terms
of volume or proceeds, it was the largest in Asia during this period due to mega IPO listings
(Bursa Malaysia, 2013). Though ORSs fluctuated during this period of study, they were still
prevalent. Therefore, there is a need to examine this anomaly and determine whether
Shariah-compliant status inMalaysian fixed-price IPOs affected the OSRs of IPOs.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the underlying theories
and empirical research; Section 3 presents the data and methodology; Section 4









































This section discusses the underlying theories and empirical research regarding the topic of
the study. There are two underlying theories that will be discussed. These are the signaling
and winner’s curse theories. This is followed by empirical evidences on oversubscription
and Shariah-compliant status.
One of the theoretical explanations for oversubscription is the signaling theory proposed
by Leland and Pyle (1977). According to Leland and Pyle (1977), a high fractional ownership
of a company by entrepreneur’s implies that there are certain features of the company’s
prospect that face a higher risk, and this will provide a credible signal to future investors.
The signaling models formalized by Allen and Faulhaber (1989), Grinblatt and Hwang
(1989) and Welch (1989) demonstrate that underpricing is used as a signal which signifies
that the firms are of high quality, and in that phase, an underpriced IPOs firms are
considered better firms. In all these models, good quality firms would receive good response
from investors for their respective IPOs. Therefore, investors’ demand is an important
component that determines the success of the IPOs. Investors normally pay attention to
information that is available prior to making a decision. Rational investors use the
information to subscribe to quality IPOs. When listing IPOs, issuers have the opportunity to
signal the true quality of the IPOs through disclosures of information in the prospectus. The
disclosures may influence the demand for shares as the informed investors tend to subscribe
to good quality issues which is consistent with the argument highlighted by Álvarez and
González (2005).
Another widely accepted theoretical explanation which has been suggested to explain
the oversubscription of IPOs is the winner’s curse hypothesis by Rock (1986). This theory
explains the adverse selection problem faced by uninformed investors who are less aware of
the true value of the issuing firms. On the contrary, informed investors have more
information about the real value of issuing firms. The informed investors would only
subscribe to good-quality IPOs that have a future potential and are worthy of their price.
Moreover, informed investors are unlikely to subscribe to an IPO if they feel that there is a
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bidding process, the uninformed investors would place the order to subscribe and are more
likely to secure their subscription. Thus, investments in these IPOs can be aligned to a
“curse” to the uninformed investors when they realize that the IPOs are overpriced. As such,
they avoid entering the IPO market. To attract uninformed investors to enter the market,
issuers and underwriters usually have to offer discounts, and this strategy leads to the
underpricing of new issues. Thus, the participation of informed investors and uninformed
investors would increase the oversubscription rate of the IPOs involved.
In developed countries, there has been very little focus on factors that influence
oversubscription as the pricing mechanism is different and information on pre-market
oversubscription is almost non-existent in the book-building and auction pricing
mechanisms. As mentioned earlier, the final IPO price is determined by using investors’ bids
(demand from investors) once the bidding has closed. It is noted that currently only Low and
Yong (2011) had examined the factors that explain the oversubscription anomaly in the
Malaysian market. However, the determinant of OSR was very much focused on
information related to a firm’s actions during the IPO process, such as investor enthusiasm,
IPO volume, opportunity cost of funds and offer price. According to Low and Yong (2011),
pre-listing information will affect the oversubscription and has become prevalent, especially
in countries that use a fixed-price mechanism. This issue has not been covered in the
literature based on theMalaysia fixed-price IPOs. Thus, this study instigates this issue. This
study postulates that there are several factors which should be analyzed to understand the
phenomenon of oversubscription of IPOs in Malaysia with the Shariah-compliant status as
one of the distinct features in theMalaysian market.
With regard to the Shariah-compliant status, the screening criteria and Shariah-
compliant index serve as a guide to investors in making investment decisions on Shariah-
compliant equity. According to Sadeghi (2008), shares included in the Shariah-compliant
index would usually receive positive response from investors due to the permissible element
in this index. However, very few studies have been conducted on the impact of Shariah-
compliance on IPO listing (Abdul-Rahim and Che-Embi, 2013; Abdul-Rahim and Yong,
2010; Mayes and Alqahtani, 2015). Abdul-Rahim and Yong (2010) noted that several factors
affected the initial returns of Shariah sub-sample, such as the offer size and offer type. Based
on observations of 386 IPOs for the period of 1999 to 2007, they found the demand from
investors was significantly related to initial returns of the Shariah sample. However, they
did not empirically prove whether Shariah-compliant status played a role in explaining the
phenomenon of oversubscription of Malaysian IPOs. Apart from the present study, there
appears to be very few studies on the influence of Shariah on the OSR of IPOs.
Recently, Abdul-Rahim and Che-Embi (2013) investigated the initial returns of
Malaysian Shariah-compliant versus non-Shariah-compliant IPOs. Based on 384 IPOs listed
during 1999 to 2007, they found that the initial returns of Shariah and non-Shariah-
compliant IPOs were not statistically different. However, there is no proof whether the firms’
choice to comply with the Shariah regulations influence and affect investors’ demand. In
contrast to Abdul-Rahim and Yong (2010) and Abdul-Rahim and Che-Embi (2013), Mayes
and Alqahtani (2015) found that Shariah-compliant status has reduced the underpricing of
IPOs in Saudi Arabia. Based on 72 IPOs that were issued from 2004 to 2010, the negative
impact of IPOs which carried the Shariah-compliant status on underpricing showed that the
issuer and underwriter took into consideration the Shariah-compliant status when setting
the offer price. As for non-Shariah IPOs, the issuer and underwriter may have given greater









































3. Data and methodology
This section begins with a description of the data and sample. Next, the methodology
specification used in this study is discussed. This is followed by a discussion on the
measurement of variables used in this study. Finally, a summary of variables, measurement
and sources is presented in Table II.
3.1 Data and sample
The data used in this study were compiled from the websites of Bursa Malaysia, Malaysian
Issuing House, Securities Commission and company prospectus. There were a total of 301
IPOs that were issued from January 2005 to December 2015. Financial companies which
include banks, financial services, insurance companies and real-estate investment trusts
(REITs) were excluded from the sample due to differences in the presentation of their
financial statement. In line with Abdul Rahim and Yong (2010) and Yong (2007), to avoid
less meaningful outcomes (uncommon type of issues), this study further restricted the
sample based on the following criteria:
 restricted public issue;
 restricted offer for sale;
 restricted offer for sale to eligible employees;
 restricted offer for sale to Bumiputera investors;
 special and restricted issue to Bumiputera investors; and
 special issue and tender offer.
Furthermore, this study excluded IPOs that had extreme values that might influence the
regression model. These outliers were identified through the value of studentized residuals
((Kleinbaum et al., 2013; Ruppert, 2004). A total of 49 IPOs were excluded from the sample
based on the selection criteria and removal of outliers. The final sample of 252 IPOs was
estimated in the regression model. A summary of the final sample by year of listing from
2005 to 2015 is presented in Table I.
3.2 Method
This study uses a cross-sectional multiple regression analysis to examine the impact of the
Shariah-compliant status on oversubscription of IPOs. The regression model, which
includes six controlled variables, is represented as follows:
OSRi ¼ a þ b 1DSHARIAHi þ b 2LNSIZEi þ b 3PRIVATEi þ b 4RETAILi
þ b 5DRETURNi þ b 6DCRISISi þ b 7MKTCONi þ « i (1)
Table I.
Summary of IPOs by
year of listing from
2005 to 2015
Listing year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total
IPO 79 40 26 23 14 29 28 17 17 15 13 301
Less finance and REIT companies 6 2 2 0 0 2 1 1 3 1 3 21
Less uncommon type of issues 1 4 3 5 0 2 1 2 2 0 0 20
Less outliers 1 1 0 1 0 0 2 2 0 1 0 8










































The dependent variable in this study is IPOs oversubscription ratio, which is determined by
dividing the total number of shares demanded by investors over the total number of shares
offered. In this study, the OSR specifically focuses on the investors’ pre-listing demand for
the IPOs (Agarwal et al., 2008; Low and Yong, 2011). The higher the OSR of a particular IPO,
the more likely it is to show strong interest and confidence from investors for that IPO. The
OSR is determined as follows:
OSR ¼ Total number of shares demanded from an IPO
Total number of shares offered in an IPO
(2)
There are seven independent variables in this study in which Shariah-compliant status
stands as the main variable, whereas offer size (LNSIZE), institutional investor (PRIVATE),
retail investor (RETAIL), investor sentiment (DRETURN), financial crisis (DCRISIS) and
market condition (MKTCON) become control variables. Shariah-compliant status indicates
that a company’s activities are free from non-permissible conduct. The Shariah-compliant
status is awarded by SAC, following a screening process. In this study, the Shariah-
compliant status is proxied by a dummy DSHARIAH, in which 1 represents the Shariah-
compliant status and 0 represents otherwise. To be a Shariah-compliant IPO, the issuer
must comply with the rules of the SAC and be free from elements of non-halal business
conduct and interest (riba). One of the advantages of Shariah-compliant securities is that it
will attract global investors to subscribe to the shares. This conjecture is consistent with
Sadeghi (2008) who argued that with the introduction of Shariah-compliant index, investors
especially Muslims from the Middle East have responded positively, due to the permissible
and non-permissible elements in this index. Accordingly, the introduction of Shariah-
compliant index has led to a higher demand of shares. Therefore, this study argues that
when firms comply with the Shariah requirement, investors feel more secure and safe to
invest as the regulations are stringent. This will increase the OSR.
In analyzing the relationship between the main variables and oversubscriptions, the first
control variable is offer size or proceed. It plays a significant role in influencing
oversubscription. A theoretical analysis by Benveniste and Busaba (1997) proved that
information from book-building procedure enabled issuing firms to alter the IPO offering
size, and this serves as an extremely economical source of raising capital. However, this
would not be possible if the IPOs were placed under a fixed-price mechanism. This is
because the issue size and IPO price have been fixed without revealing much information to
investors. Due to the scenario in which the offer size has been put in place and created
without considering investors’ demand, the offer size could influence the level of IPO
oversubscription. Small issue size helps to ease the possibility of IPO oversubscription due
to less issues being offered to prospective investors. In this study, offer size (LNSIZE) is
calculated as follows:
LNSIZE ¼ ln TSI x POFFERð Þ½  (3)
where
LN = natural log,
TSI = total number of issued shares; and
P OFFER= offer price of the IPO.
The second variable, institutional investors are considered as informed investors. The
winner’s curse hypothesis by Rock (1986) suggested that as institutional investors are








































higher the number of participants involved. Yong (2011) and Mohd-Rashid et al. (2014)
studied the Malaysian IPOs and noted that in the absence of institutional investors, retail
investors are compensated with lower initial returns, possibly due to the winner’s curse
theory. Therefore, this study views that firms with a higher institutional investor
involvement send positive signals to investors as they are better informed of the true value
of the firms. This study hypothesizes the demand from investors for particular shares to
increase if the proportion of shares held by institutional investors is large. Institutional
investor involvement (PRIVATE) is measured by dividing a private placement with the
total number of shares issued:
PRIVATE ¼ Shares placed privately
Total number of shares issued
(4)
The third variable, retail investors can be regarded as individuals who purchase securities to
be kept in their personal accounts in a smaller amount compared to securities purchased by
institutional investors. In the literature, retail investors are considered as uninformed
investors. According to Rock (1986), shares with a larger allocation to retail investors become
a curse to uninformed investors and the shares would generate negative returns as they are
overpriced. Therefore, investors tend not to subscribe to shares of company with a larger
allocation to retail investors. In this study, the percentage of retail offering (RETAIL) over the
total number of shares issued is used for retail investor involvement (Tajuddin et al., 2016):
RETAIL ¼ Shares offered to retail investors
Total number of shares issued
(5)
The fourth variable, investor sentiment is proxied by initial returns. Initial returns reflect
the percentage of changes between closing and offer prices on the listing day. In this study,
the IPOs are grouped into high and low initial returns. A dummy initial return (DRETURN)
is used as a proxy for investor sentiment, as suggested by Baker andWurgler (2006), Bayley
et al. (2006) and Low and Yong (2011), as well as Tajuddin et al. (2015). If the average initial
returns of IPOs in a particular month are greater than the average of all IPOs, a dummy of 1
will be assigned to that month and 0 otherwise. Assuming that investors are optimistic of
the IPOs, it would increase the demand from investors to subscribe to the IPOs. Therefore,
this study hypothesizes that when optimism among investors is high, it would increase the
OSR. We have conjectured that investor sentiment using the proxy of dummy initial return
and oversubscription are positively correlated.
The fifth variable, financial crisis representing the period of the global financial crisis that
affectedMalaysian economywas from2008 to 2010. In this study, a dummyvariable takes avalue
of 1 if the IPO is undertaken during global financial crisis, and it is equal to 0 if the IPO is
undertaken at any other time period. This study has conjectured that the global financial crisis
during2008 to2010,usingtheproxyof “DCRISIS,”andoversubscriptionarenegativelycorrelated.
Finally, prior to IPO listing, market condition is known as one of the significant
determining variables in predicting demand and returns of IPOs. Market environment
influences the enthusiasm or interest of investors to subscribe to IPOs. Derrien andWomack
(2003) found market returns as significant ex ante predictors of the level of underpricing of
French IPOs. In their study, the market return was used as a proxy for the three months
market price prior to listing. Furthermore, they used three-month weighted average of
returns before offering date as their emphasis was on investors’ perception of the effect of









































from the market conditions not only affected the number of successful listings but was vital
in determining the demand for IPOs. As the IPOs samples were from various industries and
of different size, it was appropriate to use the EMAS index as market price. In this study, the
weighted average of three-month EMAS index returns prior to IPO listing was used to
represent the market condition. Therefore, this study hypothesized that market condition
was positively related to OSR. Themarket condition (MKTCON) is calculated as follows:










t =1 is the return in the month prior to listing;
t =3 is the return in the 3 month prior to listing;
MKTCONPre Offerings=market condition prior to offering and
MR =Market returns of EMAS index duringmonth t.
A summary of the variables, measurement and sources is presented in Table II.
4. Findings and discussion
Table III provides a descriptive statistics involving a sample of 252 IPOs listed since
January 2005 till December 2015. On an average, the OSR for the whole sample is 23.21









Total number of shares demanded by investor to total
number of shares offered
Agarwal et al. (2008),
Low and Yong (2011)
Shariah-compliant Status
(DSHARIAH)
Dummy variable in which “1” represents the Shariah-
complaint status and “0” non Shariah-complaint
Abdul-Rahim and
Che-Embi (2013)
Offer size (LNSIZE) Natural log total number of shares issue times the
offer price
Low and Yong (2011)
Institutional investor
involvement (PRIVATE)
Percentage of shares placed privately over total
number of shares issued





Percentage of shares offered to retail investors over
total number of shares issued
Tajuddin et al. (2016)
Investor sentiment
(DRETURN)
Dummy initial return in which “1” if the average
initial return of IPOs in a particular month is greater
than the average of all IPOs whereby dummy “0”
otherwise
Baker and Wurgler




Dummy variable that take a value of “1” if an IPO is
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undersubscription of 50 per cent or a subscription of only 50 per cent of the overall issue,
whereas the highest oversubscription is 227.01 times. The massive difference between the
minimum and maximum oversubscription shows that the demand for each IPO issued in
Malaysia varies. This scenario has allowed and provided an avenue for this study to further
examine a number of factors that influence oversubscription.
The whole sample has been segregated between Shariah sample and non-Shariah
sample. The Shariah IPOs report an average oversubscription of 24.93 times which is almost
similar to the whole sample that shows 23.21 times. This finding is as expected because 85
per cent of the IPOs issued in Malaysia carry the SAC Shariah-compliant status. However,
the total number of shares issued by the non-Shariah IPOs is larger than the Shariah IPOs,
which is about 22 million.
The average number of shares issued is 148 million with a median value of 45.02 million.
The lowest (highest) number of shares issued is 3.71 million (2.48 billion). This shows a huge
difference among issue sizes of Malaysian IPOs. On an average, an offer price of IPOs is RM
0.95 and the highest offer price is RM 5.20. The average offer price of Shariah IPOs which is
RM0.95 is higher than themean shown by the non-Shariah IPOs of RM0.92.
For allocation to investors, the average allocation of IPOs to uninformed investors or
retail investors is 16.15 per cent and the highest percentage is 75.07 per cent. Meanwhile, the
average allocation of IPOs for informed investors (institutional investors) is 60.61 per cent
with a maximum of 98.50 per cent, indicating that the subscriber for IPOs is mainly from
this group of investors. As for the crisis dummy, an average of 0.22 shows that 22 per cent of
the total IPOs were offered during this period. The average crisis dummy of Shariah IPOs is
0.23, which is higher than themean shown by the non-Shariah IPOs of 0.18.
Market condition reports a mean of 0.87 per cent returns and it ranges from 6.64 per
cent to 7.88 per cent. The positive average returns imply that IPO firms go for listing when
the stock market is generally performing well in the period of three months before the













(N = 38) Median Minimum Maximum
Standard
deviation
Oversubscription (times) 23.21 24.93 13.55 12.14 0.50 227.01 33.31
Dummy Shariah 0.85 – – 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.36
Number of shares issued
(million) 148.00 145.00 167.00 45.02 3.71 2,480.00 346.00
Offer price (RM) 0.95 0.95 0.92 0.70 0.15 5.20 0.80
Retail offering (%) 16.15 16.30 15.32 14.35 0.00 75.07 10.85
Institutional offering (%) 60.61 61.87 53.53 69.55 0.00 98.50 27.25
Dummy crisis 0.22 0.23 0.18 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.42
Initial return (%) 14.77 16.76 3.59 6.83 78.45 263.64 41.38
Market condition (%) 0.82 0.87 0.55 1.01 6.64 7.88 2.37
Notes: Oversubscription ratio is the number of times the IPOs are oversubscribed. Dummy Shariah is
dummy variable for Shariah-compliant which takes a value 1 for Shariah-compliant IPOs and 0 otherwise.
Number of shares issued is the offer size. Offer price is the IPOs offering price. Retail offering is the
percentage allocation of the issued to retail investors. Institutional is the percentage allocation of the issued
to the institutional investors. Dummy crisis refers to the period of the global financial crisis that takes a
value of 1 if an IPO is offered in the period 2008 to 2010 and 0 otherwise. Market condition is the weighted
average of three months EMAS index returns prior to IPO listing. Initial return is percentage change in









































the lowest return of about negative 78.45 per cent, whereas the highest return is 263.64
per cent.
Table IV presents the correlation matrix for all variables. Most of the independent
variables have a correlation of less than 0.4, except for PRIVATE and RETAIL which show
a significant negative relationship of 0.41.
Table V displays a comparison between mean values of high and low demand IPOs,
Shariah and non-Shariah IPOs and IPOs prior and after financial crisis 2008 to 2010. They
are reported in Panels A, B and C, respectively. Panel A displays the level of
oversubscription rate which differs substantially across high and low investor demand
groups. In the case of high investor demand group, the oversubscription is 41.22 times,
whereas for the low investor demand group, the average is only 5.20 times.
The average Shariah IPO for the low investor demand group (0.79) is less than that of the
high investor demand group (0.90). This suggests that investors prefer to subscribe to IPOs
which possess Shariah-compliant status. On an average, the number of shares issued is only
57.75 million for the high-demand IPO group as compared to an average of 239 million of
shares issued for the low-demand IPOs. This shows that a small number of shares issued
has an impact on the IPO oversubscription due to a small issue size, and that more investors
would compete to subscribe to less shares issues. On an average, the market capitalization
for a high investor demand group is lower (RM171.73m) in comparison with that of the low
investor demand group (RM1,735.89m). Meanwhile, high-demand IPOs group also has a
lower offer price which is RM0.77 as compared to low-demand IPOs group which is RM1.13.
This indicates that investors are more likely to subscribe to small companies with a lower
offer price. Usually, companies that with lower market capitalization are young and small
companies do not have an established business. Therefore, the issuers have to underprice
their IPOs to attract the demand from investors. The above discussions are in line with
Benveniste and Busaba (1997) and Chowdhry and Nanda (1996) who noted that small
companies are associated with higher demand from investors.
Another interesting point to note is that a high-demand IPO group has less participation
from retail investors and possesses greater involvement from institutional investors





Variables OSR DSHARIAH LNSIZE PRIVATE RETAIL DRETURN DCRISIS MKTCON
OSR 1.00
DSHARIAH 0.12* 1.00
LNSIZE 0.31*** 0.09 1.00
PRIVATE 0.18*** 0.11* 0.17*** 1.00
RETAIL 0.21*** 0.03 0.23*** 0.41*** 1.00
DRETURN 0.30*** 0.10 0.23*** 0.04 0.03 1.00
DCRISIS 0.21*** 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.03 1.00
MKTCON 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.06 0.07*** 0.00** 1.00
Notes: ***, **and *denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. OSR is
oversubscription ratio. DSHARIAH is dummy that takes a value 1 for Shariah-compliant IPOs and 0
otherwise. LNSIZE is the natural logarithm of the total number of shares issue times the offer price.
PRIVATE is the percentage allocation of the issued to the institutional investors. RETAIL is the percentage
allocation of the issued to retail investors. DRETURN is dummy takes a value 1 if IPO is listed in a month
in which equally weighted average initial return of the month is above the median and 0 otherwise.
DCRISIS is representing the period of the global financial crisis that takes a value of 1 if an IPO is offered in
the period 2008 to 2010 and 0 otherwise. Market condition is the weighted average of three months EMAS




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































allocation for uninformed investors or retail investors, they would face adverse selection
problems as argued in the winner’s curse theory. Thus, the involvement of informed
investors or institutional investors will often signal that the company has a good future
prospect.
Meanwhile, investors stay away from IPOs during the period of global financial crisis
due to uncertainty in the stock market. Only 13 or only 7 per cent IPOs are highly demanded
during the financial crisis as compared to 32 per cent or 18 IPOs that are less demanded
during the same period. Furthermore, high-demand IPO groups have received higher initial
returns which are 24.31 per cent, compared to the ratio of low-demand IPO groups, which is
only 5.23 per cent initial return. It is not surprising that the high oversubscription
phenomenon is usually related to large IPO underpricing and this seems consistent with
findings of previous studies, such as Agarwal et al. (2008) and Low and Yong (2011).
However, such evidence can be seen at the time of IPOs listing during good market
condition, which is 1.17 per cent for high-demand IPO groups, whereas for low-demand
groups, the market condition is only 0.47 per cent. This indicates that high-demand IPO
groups believe that they will receive higher returns when subscribing IPOs listing during
good market condition.
The observed mean differences for OSR, Shariah-compliant status, number of shares
issued, market capitalization, offer price, retail offering, private placement, financial crisis,
initial returns and market condition between high- and low-demand groups are all
significant at the 5 per cent level except for retail and institutional offering. Furthermore, we
analyze whether there is a significant difference on the size (represented by market
capitalization) of Shariah-compliant versus non-Shariah-compliant companies. Result as
reported in Panel B of Table V shows that there is an insignificant difference on the size of
the Shariah and non-Shariah-compliant companies except for oversubscription and initial
return. This finding indicates that the difference in OSR could not be attributed to the size of
Shariah- and non-Shariah-compliant companies.
As displayed in Panel C of Table V, the oversubscription mean for IPOs prior to the
financial crisis is 32.44 times, whereas after the financial crisis, it is only 17.97 times. Before
the financial crisis, approximately 91 per cent of the IPOs are Shariah-compliant, whereas
after the financial crisis, the figure reduces to about 73 per cent. Further observation shows
that prior to the financial crisis, the number of shares issued (47.06 million), market
capitalization (RM134.40 million), offer price (RM0.78) and institutional offering (52.96 per
cent) are significantly lower than those IPOs which were issued after the financial crisis that
carry the highest number of shares issued (299.92 million), market capitalization
(RM1,639.82 billion), offer price (RM1.09) and institutional offering (71.27 per cent). The
difference is mainly contributed by mega IPOs listing by companies, such as AirAsia X
Berhad, Astro Malaysia Holdings Berhad, Bumi Armada Berhad, Felda Global Ventures
Holding Berhad, Gas Malaysia Berhad, IHH Healthcare Berhad, Malakoff Corporation
Berhad, MSM Malaysia Holdings Berhad, Maxis, Petronas Chemical Group Berhad, UOA
Development Berhad and Westports Holdings Berhad. The average initial return before the
financial crisis is 20.61 per cent as compared to 15.04 per cent after the financial crisis, but it
is not significantly different.
The cross-sectional multiple regression analysis result shown in Table VI quantifies the
role of IPOs in explaining investors’ demands (oversubscription ratio). We present the
findings for the whole sample, Shariah sample and non-Shariah sample. Before we proceed
in explaining the results, a few diagnostic tests have been executed. The Jarque–Bera (JB)
test statistics is used to examine the normality of data distribution and to ensure the








































residuals are normally distributed. However, non-normality is not an issue based on the
central limit theorem which stated that the normality assumption could be ignored due to
the sample size, which in this study was sufficiently large at more than 200 observations.
Based on the variance inflation factor (VIF) values that range from 1.286 to 2.682, it is clear
that multicollinearity is not a problem in this study (Kleinbaum et al., 2013). Furthermore,
the coefficients reported were generated using the Newey–West procedure to correct for the
problems of autocorrelation.
Overall, the adjusted R2 shows that the independent variables in the model could explain
29 per cent of the variations in IPO oversubscription ratio. We found that the Shariah-
compliant status was related positively and significantly to an IPO oversubscription ratio
for the whole sample. The introduction of Shariah-compliant status provides a positive
signal to the market as these companies would need to fulfill a stringent requirement to be
classified as Shariah-compliant IPOs. This would mean that Shariah-compliant IPOs are
less risky than the non-Shariah IPOs, which could possibly attract both theMuslim and non-
Muslim investors.
Pertaining to the size of offering (LNSIZE), the results showed a negative and significant
relationship between issue size and IPO oversubscription. In other words, the smaller the
size of the offering, the fewer the number of shares are available for subscription by
investors; consequently, this increases the possibility of oversubscription of IPOs. The
negative relationship between the offer size and OSR is also consistent with the findings of
previous studies (Mohd-Rashid et al., 2013; Mok and Hui, 1998; Yu and Tse, 2006).
We observed that the involvement of institutional investors (PRIVATE) was positively





model of 252 IPOs
listed from 2005 to
2015
Variables
Whole (N = 252) Shariah (N = 214) Non-Shariah (N = 38)
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
Dependent variable is oversubscription ratio
DSHARIAH 6.181 1.984** – – – –
LNSIZE 7.192 3.576*** 7.418 3.417*** 4.469 2.061**
PRIVATE 0.160 2.269** 0.196 2.198** 0.044 0.946
RETAIL 0.760 2.630*** 0.761 2.410** 0.431 1.473
DRETURN 15.159 2.237** 15.834 2.058** 11.020 1.808*
DCRISIS 16.977 3.904*** 17.151 3.562*** 13.893 2.249**
MKTCON 164.859 2.443** 172.266 2.188** 126.959 1.851**
C 144.018 3.887*** 151.677 3.737*** 97.071 2.159**
Adjusted R2 0.288 0.299 0.296
F-Statistics 15.505*** 14.736*** 3.589***
Probability 0.000 0.000 0.008
Durbin–Watson 0.597 0.613 0.820
VIF range 1.286-2.682 1.559-6.935 1.495-15.158
Notes: ***, **and *denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively. OSR is
oversubscription ratio. DSHARIAH is dummy that takes a value 1 for Shariah-compliant IPOs and 0
otherwise. LNSIZE is the natural logarithm of the total number of shares issue times the offer price.
PRIVATE is the percentage allocation of the issued to the institutional investors. RETAIL is the percentage
allocation of the issued to retail investors. DRETURN is dummy takes a value 1 if IPO is listed in a month
in which equally weighted average initial return of the month is above the median and 0 otherwise. Dummy
crisis refers to the period of the global financial crisis that takes a value of 1 if an IPO is offered in the period
2008 to 2010 and zero otherwise. Market condition is the weighted average of three months EMAS index









































the quality of the IPOs, and this scenario seems consistent with the winner’s curse hypothesis
proposed by Rock (1986). Rock (1986) suggested that informed investors were more likely to
subscribe to an IPO if they felt that there was a higher probability that the IPO was
underpriced. The large proportion of institutional investors who subscribe to the IPO would
subsequently attract uninformed investors’ interest in a particular stock and increase the
likelihood of oversubscription.
On the other hand, the allocation to retail investors (RETAIL) was significant and
inversely related to the IPOs oversubscription. The finding supports the winner’s curse
hypothesis by Rock (1986) that shares with large allocation for retail investors become a
curse to uninformed investors as the shares would generate negative returns as they are
overpriced. Therefore, investors are unlikely to subscribe to an IPO that has large
allocations for retail investors, which results in reducing the oversubscription.
Evidence on investors’ sentiment (DRETURN) was positively significant in influencing
the oversubscription. The finding is consistent with that of Cornelli et al. (2006) and Low and
Yong (2011) that the investors would be interested to subscribe to an IPO when the returns
are higher on the first day of listing because it creates a good impression to the market
participants. Such enthusiasm will push and induce investors’ subscription of an IPO and
increase the probability of oversubscription.
The coefficient for the financial crisis (DCRISIS) was negatively significant in
influencing the oversubscription. This is because during the global financial crisis, most
investors would not apply for the IPO shares when the market turns bearish and this
reduces the subscription rate.
The effect of market condition (MKTCON)was positively significant in explaining IPOs
oversubscription. The finding suggests that oversubscriptions of IPOs are very much
dependent on the market condition prior to the offering. It also revealed that good market
conditions would reduce the uncertainty of the investment. Thus, it would create an
advantage in attracting investors to subscribe to the IPOs and contribute to
oversubscription. This result is consistent with previous studies, such as those by Derrien
andWomack (2003), Loughran and Ritter (2002) and Ma and Faff (2007), which inferred that
market conditions were vital in influencing investors to subscribe to the IPOs.
Based on the results, we observed that all variables (offer size, institutional investors,
retail investors, investor sentiment, financial crisis and market condition) were significant in
explaining oversubscription of Shariah and the whole sample. The similarities found in the
relationship between the Shariah and whole sample are more likely caused by the fact that a
majority or 85 per cent of newly listed companies possessed Shariah-compliant status.
However, the relationship between the variables and oversubscription for non-Shariah
sample showed that only the offer size, investor sentiment, financial crisis and market
condition were consistently significant in explaining the OSR.
The next analysis uses the quantile regression model in estimating the impact of Shariah-
compliant status IPOs at different levels of oversubscription, as shown in Table VII. The
quantile regression model allows for a more comprehensive description of the conditional
distribution in comparison to only having a conditional mean analysis. This has allowed us
to describe and to examine how the median, whether it is the minimum or maximum
percentile of the dependent variables, has been influenced by a number of independent
variables. Furthermore, the quantile regression model offers a robust approach of modeling
the relationships, as it does not require strong distributional assumptions (Koenker and
Bassett, 1978). The approximation of a linear relationship between a specified quantile and a
host of independent variables is produced by a quantile regression which includes the 25th,








































Focusing on the impact of the main variable which is the Shariah-compliant status, we found
that the coefficient of DSHARIAH was highly significant in the 75th quantile. It implies that
the impact of the Shariah-compliant was stronger when oversubscription rate was higher. The
finding is consistent with that of Sadeghi (2008) who argued that with Shariah certification, it
would signal quality and thus, receive positive responses from investors due to the permissible
elements in these shares. The pseudo R2 for the 25th, 50th and 75th quantile are 8.6, 12.8 and
22.5 per cent, respectively. According to Koenker andMachado (1999), the pseudo R-squared or
goodness-of-fit measure in the quantile regression is analogous to R-squared from a
conventional regression analysis. In addition, the goodness-of-fit also is one of the criteria to
evaluate the quality of a quantile regression model (Koenker and Machado, 1999). Overall, all
variables are significant with oversubscription in the highest 75th quantile.
5. Conclusion and implications for future studies
In this paper, we analyzed the association of Shariah-compliant status with
oversubscription of Malaysian IPOs using a sample of 252 IPOs that was issued from 2005
to 2015. The preliminary result presented the average oversubscription was 23.21 times, and
also, there is a huge gap between high and low oversubscriptions. The distinct features of
Malaysian IPOs, such as the fixed price mechanism and Shariah-compliant status, provide
an avenue for us to analyze the factors that could explain the oversubscription anomaly. We
found that investors were more interested in subscribing to a smaller size of offering with
IPOs listed during good market condition that would be compensated with high initial
returns. In addition, investors are also likely to invest in IPOs with a higher percentage of
informed investors as it would signal the company has a good future prospect; therefore, it
avoids from subscribing to IPOs with large allocation to the retail investors as they do not
want to be trapped in the winners’ curse problem. Furthermore, investors are reluctant to
apply for IPO shares during the period of global financial crisis when the stock market turns
bearish. The regression showed that Shariah-compliance status positively and significantly








QUANTILE 25th QUANTILE 50th QUANTILE 75th
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
Dependent variable is oversubscription ratio
DSHARIAH 1.329 0.689 4.398 1.711* 10.229 3.061***
LNSIZE 1.931 2.969*** 3.988 3.564*** 6.972 6.042***
PRIVATE 0.026 0.794 0.051 1.052 0.094 1.750*
RETAIL 0.161 1.334 0.447 2.219** 0.726 4.641***
DRETURN 2.374 1.104 7.058 1.933* 13.601 3.238***
DCRISIS 7.133 4.011*** 10.689 3.617*** 16.507 4.135***
MKTCON 59.968 1.561 111.601 2.359** 117.716 1.751*
Constant 41.792 3.205*** 85.236 3.767*** 148.353 6.463***
Pseudo R2 0.086 0.128 0.212
Notes: ***, **and *denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. OSR is
oversubscription ratio. DSHARIAH is dummy takes a value 1 for Shariah-compliant IPOs and 0 otherwise.
LNSIZE is the natural logarithm of the total number of shares issue times the offer price. PRIVATE is the
percentage allocation of the issued to the institutional investors. RETAIL is the percentage allocation of the
issued to retail investors. DRETURN is dummy takes a value 1 if IPO is listed in a month in which equally
weighted average initial return of the month is above the median and 0 otherwise. DCRISIS refers to the period
of the global financial crisis that takes a value of 1 if an IPO is offered in the period 2008 to 2010 and zero









































compliant status attracts investors to subscribe to the IPOs due to the stringent guidelines
on listing that are associated with Shariah principles. We also found that the variables had
significant relationships with oversubscription when only Shariah-compliant IPOs were
considered. These results are consistent with the results for the whole sample. Nevertheless,
only LNSIZE, DRETURN, DCRISIS andMKTCON variables had a significant relationship
with oversubscription in non-Shariah sample. Moreover, focusing on the impact of Shariah-
compliant status at different levels of quantiles showed that the coefficient of DSHARIAH
was highly significant in the highest quantile when oversubscription rates were higher.
This study contributes to our understanding of the oversubscription anomaly
specifically in the context of the Malaysian IPO market. This study revealed how investors
responded to publicly available information (prospectus) during the subscription period.
Overall, the results of this study provide a new insight for investors regarding important
information found in the prospectus when making the decisions to subscribe to IPOs.
Furthermore, the findings from this study would offer practical understanding to the issuers
and underwriters on the factors that should be considered in assuring a good early
performance of their issuance. Therefore, it will benefit the issuers and underwriters in
managing and planning the IPO process carefully. The results from this study provide
important information for regulators and policymakers when considering the continuous
application of these policies (pricingmechanism and Shariah-compliant status) as part of the
listing requirements of IPOs to achieve the goals of positioning Malaysia as Asia’s central
hub in Islamic finance as stated in the Financial Blueprint of 2011-2020. In addition, it will
help the regulators to obtain some ideas on how these factors can be used as a mechanism to
improve market liquidity and protect the interest of minority shareholders, particularly in
the immediate aftermarket without creating an adverse impact on the performance of IPOs.
As discussed earlier, the SAC has revised the screening criteria which comprise a
business activity benchmark, as well as the introduction of financial ratio benchmark (cash
and debt) for determining Shariah-compliant status effective November 29, 2013. Thus,
future studies should look into this area of study to enhance the understanding of
oversubscription of IPOs in Malaysia as the aforementioned variables are under the
financial ratio benchmark of the Shariah-compliant status. In addition, it is likely that
oversubscription might also be affected by company directors. The inclusion of this variable
might explain further on oversubscription of IPOs inMalaysia.
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